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Abstract
A multi-player competitive Dynkin stopping game is constructed, extending the work of
Guo and Rutkowski [6]. Each player can either exit the game for a fixed payoff, determined
a priori, or stay and receive an adjusted payoff depending on the decision of other players.
The single period case is shown to be “weakly unilaterally competitive” (Kats and Thisse [10]
and De Wolf [2]). We present an explicit construction of the unique value at which Nash and
optimal equilibria are attained. Multiple period generalisations are explored. The game has
interpretations in economic and financial contexts, for example, as a consumption model with
bounded resources. It also serves as a starting point to the construction of multi-person financial
game options. In particular, the concept of optimal equilibria becomes pivotal in the pricing of
the game options via super-replication.
Keywords: Dynkin game, stopping game, n-player game, optimal equilibrium, game option.
AMS Subject Classification: 91A06, 91A10, 91A15, 91A50, 60G40.
1 Introduction
A Dynkin stopping game, first introduced by Dynkin [3], is a zero-sum, optimal stopping game
between two players where each player can stop the game for a payoff observable at that time. Much
research has been done on this as well as its related problems, e.g., [1, 4, 8, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19].
One application of Dynkin games is in game contingent claims, or game option, as defined by Kifer
[11], who proved the existence and uniqueness of its value. Further works, such as Hamade`ne and
Zhang [8] and Kallsen and Ku¨hn [9], studied various techniques in its pricing.
Various formulations of multi-player Dynkin games exist in literature. For example, Solan and
Vieille [17] introduced a quitting game which terminates when any player chooses to quit, then
each player receives a payoff depending the set of players quitting the game. Under certain payoff
conditions, a subgame perfect uniform ǫ-equilibrium using cyclic strategies can be found. In Solan
and Vieille [18], another version is presented, in which the players are given the opportunity to stop
the game in a turn-based fashion. A subgame perfect ǫ-equilibrium was again shown to exist and
consisted of pure strategies when the game is not degenerate. Hamade`ne and Hassani [7] presented
a non-zero sum stopping game where each player has his own separate payoff processes. These
processes are independent of the other players’ decisions, so in the event where a player does not
stop first, his payoff does not depend the exact set of players who stopped.
We aim to generalise the Dynkin stopping game to more than two players in a natural way
which allows for the construction of a multi-person financial game option. Guo and Rutkowski
[6] introduced a zero-sum, simultaneous Dynkin game, with a focus on designing the dependencies
between the payoffs of all players and their stopping decisions. In effect, it is modelling a multilateral
“contract” where all the players are competing for a fixed total sum of wealth. Each player can either
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exit or terminate the contract for a predetermined benefit, or do nothing and receive an adjusted
benefit, reflecting the discrepancies caused by any exiting decisions. These adjustments ensure that
the total wealth is fixed.
This paper extends the results of Guo and Rutkowski [6] to games which are not necessarily
zero-sum, but still retains the “weakly unilaterally competitive” (or WUC) property introduced by
Kats and Thisse [10] and De Wolf [2]. As discussed Pruzhansky [15], Nash equilibria are not always
adequate as a solution concept. This certainly occurs in the valuation of the game options, as the
Nash equilibria payoffs cannot be guaranteed. Instead, we formally introduce the stronger “optimal
equilibria”, or Nash equilibria with maximin strategies, which induces a unique value for the game.
The WUC property ensures that all Nash equilibria are also optimal equilibria.
The main results of the paper are Theorems 3.7 and 4.9, which proves the existence of the value
by explicit construction, and expresses it as the projection onto a simplex under an appropriate
choice of inner product. The construction also produces a pure strategy optimal equilibrium.
Several extensions are discussed. All single period results can be immediately applied to the
stochastic case where both terminal and exercise payoffs are random, as long as expectations are
incorporated into the definitions of solution and equilibria. Also, two multiple period generalisations
are studied, including a recursive stopping game and a quitting game. The recursive stopping game
can be readily applied to multi-person financial game options, where the properties of the optimal
equilibrium become imperative in the pricing arguments. Details will be presented in an upcoming
paper. The quitting game is a variant which cannot be stopped early, but each player can choose
to quit at any time. Optimal equilibria are constructed for deterministic case and subgame perfect
optimal equilibria are constructed if the game is perfect information.
Apart from multi-person financial game options, the game presented here may be interpreted in
other economic and financial contexts, for example, as a consumption model with bounded resources.
It serves as a starting point to a particular class of competitive multi-player games. Many more
multiple period and continuous time generalisations are possible, and they are under further research.
Section 2 of the paper establishes some preliminary results in game theory and introduces the
optimal equilibrium. Section 3 constructs the single period game and proves the existence and
uniqueness of the value. Section 4 revisits the results of Guo and Rutkowski [6] and applies them
to non-zero sum settings. The value is constructed using projection. Section 5 applies the results to
the stochastic case, and then examines two multiple period possibilities.
2 Optimal Equilibrium
This section will discuss several game theory concepts, while keeping track of two main focuses:
To find solution concepts applicable to the pricing of financial game options, as well as conditions
characterising the idea of competitiveness in multi-person games.
Consider a game G with m players, enumerated by the indices 1, 2, . . . ,m. The set of all players
is denoted by M. Each player k can choose a strategy sk ∈ Sk, and the m-tuples of strategies
s =
[
s1, . . . , sm
]
∈ S are strategy profiles. Given a strategy profile s, it is possible to compute a
vector of payoff functions V (s) = [V1(s), . . . , Vm(s)] for the players, with larger payoffs being more
desirable.
As introduced by Nash [13], a strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is referred to as a Nash equilibrium,
or simply an equilibrium, if no single player can improve his payoff by altering his own strategy.
Formally, for each k ∈M,
Vk
([
s∗k, s
∗
−k
])
≥ Vk
([
sk, s
∗
−k
])
, ∀ sk ∈ Sk.
A Nash equilibrium represents a state which no player would deviate from. It gives some intuition
to the value of the game, but in the context of game options, there are several deficiencies. The
valuation of financial options involves replication of payoffs. But in general, this is not possible
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without knowing the action of the other players. One cannot assume that the other players will
converge towards Nash equilibria, so the equilibrium payoffs are not guaranteed. Furthermore a
game may have several equilibria leading to different payoff values, and it’s not always clear which
one should be chosen.
We formally introduce a new, stronger concept to address these issues.
Definition 2.1 (Optimal Equilibrium). A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is called an optimal equilibrium
if, for each k ∈M,
Vk
([
s∗k, s−k
])
≥ Vk
([
s∗k, s
∗
−k
])
≥ Vk
([
sk, s
∗
−k
])
, ∀ sk ∈ Sk, ∀ s−k ∈ S−k.
An optimal equilibrium is essentially a saddle point. It has the properties of a Nash equilibrium,
with the addition that each player can guarantee a lower bound on his payoff without knowing the
actions of other players. In other words, it replicates the properties of a Nash equilibrium with
maximin strategies, as discussed in Pruzhansky [15]. This is crucial in the context of a game option
as it allows for super-replication. Furthermore, as shown in Proposition 2.3, all optimal equilibria
achieve the same value.
Definition 2.2 (Minimax, Maximin, Value).
• The maximin value of player k is the maximum payoff he can guarantee.
V k = max
sk∈Sk
min
s−k∈S−k
Vk
([
sk, s−k
])
• The minimax value of player k is the lowest payoff that the other players can force upon him.
V k = min
s−k∈S−k
max
sk∈Sk
Vk
([
sk, s−k
])
• In general, V k ≥ V k. If equality is achieved, then V
∗
k = V k = V k is the value of the game for
player k.
In general, a game may not have a value. But the existence of an optimal equilibrium guarantees
one.
Proposition 2.3. Let s∗ be any optimal equilibrium. Since
Vk
([
s∗k, s
∗
−k
])
= max
sk∈Sk
Vk
([
sk, s
∗
−k
])
≥ V k
≥ V k ≥ min
s−k∈S−k
Vk
([
s∗k, s−k
])
= Vk
([
s∗k, s
∗
−k
])
,
all expressions are equal. Hence every optimal equilibrium attains the value of the game for all
players
V (s∗) = V ∗ =
[
V ∗1 , . . . , V
∗
m
]
.
It is easily shown that any pure strategy Nash equilibrium is still a Nash equilibrium in the mixed
strategy game. The same argument can be readily applied to show that any pure strategy optimal
equilibrium is also an optimal equilibrium if mixed strategies are allowed. Hence the value of a pure
strategy game is also the value of its mixed strategy extension.
In two person zero-sum games, optimal equilibria are equivalent to Nash equilibria. In fact
Proposition 2.3 simply reduces to John von Neumann’s minimax theorem [20]. The theorem states
that in any two person, zero-sum game with finite strategies, there exists a unique payoff where
mixed strategy Nash equilibria are achieved. This unique payoff is also the value of the game.
In multi-player zero-sum games, the payoff of any particular player is not sufficient to determine
the other individual payoffs. Nash equilibria are not necessarily optimal equilibria, and they may
not achieve the same payoff. However, a result similar to the minimax theorem exists if the zero-sum
condition is strengthened to weakly unilaterally competitive, as described in Kats and Thisse [10] and
De Wolf [2].
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Definition 2.4 (Weakly Unilaterally Competitive). A game is said to be weakly unilaterally com-
petitive (or WUC) if for any k, l ∈ M:
Vk(
[
sk, s−k
]
) > Vk(
[
s′k, s−k
]
) =⇒ Vl(
[
sk, s−k
]
) ≤ Vl(
[
s′k, s−k
]
),
Vk(
[
sk, s−k
]
) = Vk(
[
s′k, s−k
]
) =⇒ Vl(
[
sk, s−k
]
) = Vl(
[
s′k, s−k
]
)
for all sk, s
′
k ∈ Sk and s−k ∈ S−k.
WUC explicitly quantifies the concept of competitiveness. If a player deviates from a strategy
profile, any changes to his payoff is opposite in sign to the changes of other payoffs. Both Kats
and Thisse [10] and De Wolf [2] proved the following result, an analogue of the minimax theorem in
multi-player, WUC settings.
Proposition 2.5. In a WUC game, any Nash equilibrium is also an optimal equilibrium.
WUC is not a necessary condition for the existence of optimal equilibria, but it eliminates
the possibilities of Nash equilibria achieving multiple values. It is a desirable condition for the
construction of our game.
Finally, this paper will only focus on pure strategy games. As shown in Ferenstein [5], a stop-
ping game with mixed or randomised strategies (in this case, randomised stopping times) can be
reformulated as a stopping game with pure strategies with an appropriate filtration enlargement.
Furthermore, in the context of evaluating game options, it is not practical to implement mixed or
randomised strategies during payoff replication.
3 Single Period Deterministic Games
Throughout this paper, the game option terminology of “exercise” will be utilised when referring to
the stopping or quitting of the game by the players. The corresponding payoff from doing so will be
called “exercise payoffs”.
Before proposing a multi-player variant, it is useful to recall the mechanism of a two person
game option, as defined in Kifer [11]. Essentially, the game option is a contract where the buyer can
exercise the option at any time t for a payoff Xt, while the seller can cancel (or also “exercise”) the
option at any time t for a cancellation fee of Yt. If no one does anything, the contract will expire at
time T with the buyer receiving XT from the seller.
Remark 3.1. It is common to postulate that the inequality Xt ≤ Yt holds for every t. In other
words, the cancellation fee should always at least as great as the exercise payoff. This circumvents
the need to deal with simultaneous exercise for the purpose of valuation. When the buyer exercises,
it will cost the seller at least as much if he also cancels. Similarly when the seller cancels, the buyer
can only lose by exercising. If the players are exercising optimally, simultaneous exercise only occurs
when the equality Xt = Yt is true, in which case the payoff is still well defined.
The assumption ofXt ≤ Yt can however be removed if we simply add another rule. If exercise and
cancellation occur simultaneously, then the buyer and the seller simply receiveXt and Yt respectively.
This offers a cleaner mechanism which can be used in non zero-sum games, yet still produces the
same value if Xt ≤ Yt holds.
When there are more than two players, symmetry needs to be introduced between the buyer and
the seller. The cancellation fee process can be interpreted as a negative exercise payoff process for
the seller. So each player k has his own exercise payoff amount Xk. And in the event that no player
exercises, each player should receive a terminal payoff Pk. In the two player version, the terminal
payoffs P1 and P2 correspond to XT and −XT .
Remark 3.2. There are various ways to generalise the exercise mechanism. In the two player
version, when one person exercises, the entire effect (or “cost”) of that action, whether positive of
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negative, is paid by the other, non-exercising player. This paper will focus on a natural extension of
that for multiple players, in which the effect of exercise is reflected in the payoffs of the non-exercising
players, according to some weight function.
We begin by setting up a single period deterministic game with m players, where exercising is
only allowed at one predetermined time.
Definition 3.3. A single period deterministic multi-player game G, with players indexed by M =
{1, 2, . . . ,m}, is specified by the following:
• The vector X = [X1, . . . , Xm], where Xk is the amount received by player k if he exercises at
time 0.
• The vector P = [P1, . . . , Pm], where Pk is the amount received by player k if no player exercises
at time 0;
The rules of the game are:
1. The strategy sk ∈ Sk of player k specifies whether player k exercises, where Sk = {0, 1} is
the space of strategies. In particular, sk = 0 means that player k exercises at time 0, whereas
sk = 1 means that player k does not exercise.
2. Given a strategy profile s ∈ S =
∏
i∈M Si, the exercise set, denoted by E(s), is the set of
exercising players.
3. For each strategy profile s, the outcomes of the game G are represented by the payoff vector
V (s) = [V1(s), . . . , Vm(s)], where Vk(s) is the payoff received by player k if a strategy profile
s is carried out. It equals
Vk(s) =
{
Xk, k ∈ E(s),
Pk − wk(E(s))D(s), k ∈ M \ E(s),
where
D(s) =
∑
i∈E(s)
(Xi − Pi)
is the difference due to exercise and wk(E(s)) is a weight function which will be chosen in
subsection 3.1 (cf. Definition 3.6).
The payoffs Vk(s) are linear functions of Xi and Pi. Most results of the deterministic case
can hence be easily extended to stochastic settings, which will be covered in subsection 5.1. The
difference due to exercise D(s) represents the effect of exercise described in Remark 3.2, and they
negatively affect the payoff of the non-exercising players if the weights are positive. As seen later in
Theorem 3.4, the positivity of weights will be an important condition for a WUC game.
If
∑
i/∈E wi(E) = 1 is satisfied for every E ⊂ M, then the sum of all payoffs is either
∑
i∈MXi
(everyone exercises) or
∑
i∈M Pi (at least one player doesn’t exercise). This correspond to the
property of the two player zero-sum game described in Remark 3.1. In fact, the two player game
can be recovered by setting w1({2}) = w2({1}) = 1.
3.1 Choice of Weights
In order to proceed further, we need to be more explicit about the way in which the weights are
specified. In general wk(E) is defined for non-empty subsets E ⊂ M, E 6= M and k /∈ E . Consider
the class of games with fixed weights wk(E) but with all possible choices of X and P . The goal of
this section is to find weights achieving two conditions :
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1. Every game in the class is WUC.
2. Every game in the class has at least one equilibrium in pure strategies.
The motivation is to separate the exercise mechanism, driven by wk(E), from the payoff parameters
X and P . Thus the game retains nice properties irrespective of the choice of X and P . This is
especially useful in stochastic cases and game options.
Furthermore, we will assume that wk(E) 6= 0 for all non-empty subset E ⊂M, E 6=M and k /∈ E .
This assumption ensures that the decision of any exercising player will always affect the payoff of
a non-exercising player. It also eliminates various degenerate cases. The WUC condition further
refines the restrictions on the weights, as shown below.
Proposition 3.4. Fixing the weights wk(E) 6= 0, the game G is WUC for all choices X and P if
and only if the weights can be written in the following form:
wk(E) =
ak
1−
∑
i∈E ai
, where ak > 0 and
∑
i6=k
ai < 1 for all k. (1)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In (1), the term ak indicates how much player k is affected by the exercise decisions of others. The
relative size of ak determines the relative size of the weights wk(E), used to redistributing D(s). By
Proposition 3.4, the game with weights defined by (1) is always WUC, fulfilling the first condition.
For the second condition of always having a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, further restrictions are
needed.
Proposition 3.5. Using weights defined by (1), if
∑
i∈M ai > 1, then there exist X and P such that
no equilibrium exists in pure strategies. In particular, X = [0, 0, . . . , 0] and P = [1,−1, 0, . . . , 0].
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Combining Propositions 3.4 and 3.5, we arrive at the following definition.
Definition 3.6 (Weights). For each non-empty subset E ⊂ M, E 6=M and k /∈ E , define the weight
wk(E) by
wk(E) =
ak
1−
∑
i∈E ai
where a1, . . . , am are real numbers satisfying ak > 0 and
∑
k∈M ak ≤ 1. In particular, 0 < wk(E) ≤ 1.
Definition 3.6 will be used as the definition of weights for the remainder of the paper. As shown
later in Theorem 3.7, the game with these weights always has a value, achieved by all Nash and
optimal equilibria.
3.2 Existence of Value
With the weights determined by Definition 3.6, the game in Definition 3.3 is now fully specified. The
main result of this subsection, as well as this paper, is to show that the game always has a value.
Recall that the uniqueness of the value was already established in Definition 2.2.
Theorem 3.7. The game G from Definition 3.3 has at least one optimal equilibrium. Hence it has
a value.
Before proving Theorem 3.7, a couple of preliminary results are required. Firstly, Lemma 3.8
shows that the subgames of G retain the same structure as G. This is a consequence of Definition
3.6.
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In the game G, consider a subset E ⊂ M and assume that every player in E exercises at time
0, while the players from M′ = M\ E are still free to make choices. The possible outcomes of the
game for the players from M′ define a subgame of G, which we denote by G′. It is possible to show
that the G′ behaves similar to G, but with modified parameters.
Lemma 3.8 (Subgame). The subgame G′ is equivalent to a game GM′ specified by the following:
• Set of players M′ =M\ E;
• X ′k = Xk, for k ∈ M
′;
• P ′k = Pk − wk(E)
∑
i∈E(Xi − Pi), for k ∈M
′;
• Weights defined by a′k = wk(E) =
ak
1−
∑
i∈E ai
, for k ∈ M′; and
• Strategy profile s′ = [s′k, k ∈ M
′] ∈ SM′ .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The property of the subgames proven in Lemma 3.8 is useful because it allows for the use of
induction on the number of players. Furthermore it allows us to extend any equilibrium results to
subgame perfect equilibrium results (for example, in section 5.3).
We also require Lemma 3.9, which asserts that the difference due to exercise has to be positive
under any Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3.9. If s∗ is an equilibrium then D(s∗) =
∑
i∈E(s∗)(Xi − Pi) ≥ 0.
Proof. Intuitively, if
∑
i∈E(s∗)(Xi − Pi) < 0, then there exists a player k ∈ Es
∗ who can do better
by not exercising. For details see Appendix A.2.
Now we are ready for the proof of Theorem 3.7.
Theorem 3.7. By Proposition 2.5, in a WUC game, all Nash equilibria are optimal equilibria and
attain the same value. So it is sufficient to construct a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
We proceed by induction on the number of players. Note that the game is still well-defined as
a single person game when m = 1, and all single person games have at least one equilibrium. In
particular, s∗ = [1] if P1 > X1 or s
∗ = [0] if P1 ≤ X1.
Consider m ≥ 2. If Pi > Xi for all i, then s∗ = 1 is an equilibrium. If Pk ≤ Xk for some
k, consider the m − 1 player subgame G{−k}. Let s
′ be an equilibrium of G{−k}, which exists by
the induction hypothesis. Consider the strategy profile s∗ = [1, s−k = s
′], we will show it is an
equilibrium of G.
By construction, s′ is an equilibrium of G{−k}, so any player i 6= k cannot improve his payoff by
changing strategy. Hence it is sufficient to check that player k cannot improve by not exercising, or
Vk(s
∗) = Xk ≥ Vk(s) = Pk − wk(E)D(s) where s = [0, s−k = s′] and E(s′) = E(s) = E . Now write
D(s) in terms of the subgame G{−k} variables P
′
i and D
′(s′) (as defined in Lemma 3.8)
D(s) =
∑
i∈E
(Xi − P
′
i ) + (P
′
i − Pi) = D
′(s′)−
∑
i∈E
wi({k})(Xk − Pk). (2)
Substituting (2) back, we want the following expression to be non-negative,
Xk − (Pk − wk(E)D(s))
= Xk − Pk + wk(E)D
′(s′)− wk(E)(Xk − Pk)
∑
i∈E
wi({k})
= wk(E)D
′(s′) + (Xk − Pk)
(
1− wk(E)
∑
i∈E
wi({k})
)
. (3)
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Applying Lemma 3.9 to the subgame G{k}, D
′(s′) ≥ 0. Also recall wk(E) ≥ 0, (Xk − Pk) ≥ 0 by
assumptions. It remains to check the last term of (3), which can be written as
1− wk(E)
∑
i∈E
wi({k}) = 1−
ak
1−
∑
i∈E ai
∑
i∈E ai
1− ak
=
1− ak −
∑
i∈E ai(
1−
∑
i∈E ai
)
(1− ak)
. (4)
Finally, (4) is non-negative because ak +
∑
i∈E ai ≤
∑
i∈M ai ≤ 1. So we indeed have Xk ≥ Vk(s).
Therefore s∗ is an equilibrium and the induction is complete.
An algorithm of finding an equilibrium s∗ follows from the proof of Theorem 3.7, by repeatedly
identifying players with Pi ≤ Xi as exercising players, and reducing the problem to a smaller case.
The equilibrium and its value are found within m− 1 iterations.
4 Construction of Value
In section 3, a multi-player game G is introduced to model a multilateral contract, where the payoffs
have an implicit competitive structure. Theorem 3.7 established that G has a value, using an
inductive argument. In this section, Theorem 4.9 will give an explicit construction of the value. The
construction is motivated by Guo and Rutkowski [6], which discussed a special case of G which is
zero-sum, and expressed the value in terms of a projection. Subsection 4.1 will briefly revisit these
results, then subsection 4.2 will extend them to the general case.
We begin by identifying the payoffs as as vectors in Rm and introducing the following notations.
Definition 4.1 (Hyperplane and Orthant). For any subset E ⊆M, define the hyperplane HE as
HE =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi = Xi, ∀ i ∈ E
}
.
In particular, H∅ = R
m and HM = X. The hyperplane HE contains all the possible payoffs if all
players in E exercise. Also define the orthant O as
O =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≥ Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
.
The boundary of O are the hyperplanes H{i}.
Proposition 4.2. The value V ∗ of the game G must lie inside the orthant O.
Proof. Given any equilibrium s∗, the payoff of each player should be at least as great as his exercise
payoff, or Vk(s
∗) ≥ Xk for all k ∈ M. Hence V ∗ ∈ O.
Remark 4.3. Given a normed vector space Rm, for any vectorP and any closed convex setK, denote
by πK (P ) the projection of P onto K. In other words, πK (P ) is a vector satisfying πK (P ) ∈ K and
‖πK (P )− P ‖ ≤ ‖Q− P ‖ , ∀Q ∈ K.
For the normed spaces discussed in the following subsections, the existence and uniqueness of the
projection are well-known.
4.1 Zero and Constant Sum Cases
This subsection will only present the main definitions and results without proof. A detailed treatment
can be found in Guo and Rutkowski [6]. Note that analogous results for the non zero-sum cases will
be presented in subsection 4.2 (cf. Proposition 4.8, Theorem 4.9 and Remark 4.10).
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Only in this subsection, add the following constraints to Definition 3.6, the definition of weights:
∑
i∈M
ai = 1 =⇒
∑
i/∈E
wi(E) =
∑
i/∈E ai
1−
∑
j∈E aj
= 1 ∀ E ⊂M, E 6= ∅. (5)
Denote the resulting game by G0. If E(s) =M, then
∑
i∈M Vi(s) =
∑
i∈MXi. Otherwise,∑
i∈M
Vi(s) =
∑
i∈E
Xi +
∑
i/∈E
(
Pi − wi(E)
∑
j∈E
(Xj − Pj)
)
=
∑
i∈E
Xi +
∑
i/∈E
Pi −
∑
j∈E
(Xj − Pj) =
∑
i∈M
Pi.
So the payoffs of G0 have a constant sum, except when everyone exercises. All possible payoffs except
one lie on the hyperplane
H
0 =
{
x ∈ Rm :
m∑
i=1
xi =
m∑
i=1
Pi
}
.
In particular, G0 is almost zero sum if
∑
i∈M Pi = 0. Next, for any proper subset E ⊂ M, define
the hyperplane
H
0
E = HE ∩H
0 =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi = Xi ∀ i ∈ E and
m∑
i=1
xi =
m∑
i=1
Pi
}
.
In particular H0∅ = H
0. This definition is not adequate when E = M, because HM ∩H0 = X ∩H0
is empty unless
∑
i∈MXi =
∑
i∈M Pi. But for completeness we further define H
0
M = HM = X.
Definition 4.4 (Inner Product and Norm). Endow Rm with the following inner product and norm
〈x,y〉0 =
m∑
i=1
(
xiyi
ai
)
, ‖x‖0 =
(
m∑
i=1
x2i
ai
) 1
2
.
The choice of norm in Definition 4.4 will be justified by Proposition 4.5, which gives an alternative
yet elegant way of representing and computing the payoff vector, provided that the exercise set is
known.
Proposition 4.5 (Payoff as Projection). For any strategy profile s ∈ S, the payoff vector V (s)
equals
V (s) = πH0
E(s)
(P )
where the projection π is taken under the norm ‖·‖0.
Consider the simplex S given by the formula
S = O ∩H0 =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≥ Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
m∑
i=1
xi =
m∑
i=1
Pi
}
.
There are a few possibilities:
• If
∑
i∈MXi >
∑
i∈M Pi, S is empty.;
• If
∑
i∈MXi =
∑
i∈M Pi, S = H
0
M = X is a single point;
• If
∑
i∈MXi <
∑
i∈M Pi, S is an m − 1 dimensional simplex, whose faces are S ∩ H
0
A as A
varies over the subsets of M.
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As mentioned in Proposition 4.2, the value V ∗ must lie inside O. Since the all payoffs of G0 but one
lie on H0, we expect V ∗ to lie in S (if it is non-empty). The following theorem shows that V ∗ is in
fact the projection of P onto S.
Theorem 4.6 (Value by Projection). In game G0, if
∑
i∈MXi ≤
∑
i∈M Pi, the value V
∗ is
V ∗ = V (s∗) = πS (P )
where the projection π is taken under the norm ‖·‖0 from Definition 4.4. An optimal equilibrium
s∗ = [s∗1, . . . , s
∗
m] is given by
s∗i = 0 ⇐⇒
[
πS (P )
]
i
= Xi.
If
∑
i∈MXi >
∑
i∈M Pi, the value is V
∗ = V (s∗) = X with an optimal equilibrium given by s∗ = 0.
The two cases in Theorem 4.6 resemble the phenomena described in Remark 3.1 for two player
game options. In the first case,
∑
i∈MXi ≤
∑
i∈M Pi is analogous to the condition Xt ≤ Yt. On
the other hand, if
∑
i∈MXi >
∑
i∈M Pi, the game becomes degenerate and every player exercises.
The effect is similar to the case of Xt > Yt in two player game options.
4.2 Non Zero-Sum Cases
This subsection extends the projection representation to cases where G is not constant (or zero)
sum, or
∑
i∈M ai < 1. The key idea is to construct an equivalent constant (or zero) sum game by
introducing a dummy player.
Given an m player game G with
∑
i∈M ai < 1, construct an m+ 1 player game G
0 by adding a
dummy player with the following attributes:
• No exercising allowed;
• Pm+1 is arbitrary, but for the sake of simplicity set Pm+1 = −
∑
i∈M Pi, so G
0 is zero-sum;
• Weights wm+1(E) =
am+1
1−
∑
i∈E ai
where am+1 = 1−
∑
i∈M ai > 0;
• Payoff function Vm+1(s) = Pm+1 − wm+1(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)(Xi − Pi).
The space of strategy profiles in G0 is the same as S from G, because player m+1 cannot make any
choices. The payoffs of players in M do not change in G0. Any Nash/optimal equilibrium for G0 is
also a Nash/optimal equilibrium of G and vice versa. Finally the value of G equals the value of G0,
after restricting to the first m coordinates.
Since G0 is zero-sum, the notations from subsection 4.1 can also be used here. Furthermore G0
has the advantage of the dummy player not being able to exercise, so the game is always zero-sum.
In other words, Vm+1(s) +
∑
i∈M Vi(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S. Hence the space of payoff vectors for G
0
is the hyperplane H0 = {x :
∑m+1
i=1 xi = 0} ⊂ R
m+1, endowed with the inner product 〈·, ·〉0 from
Definition 4.4,
〈x,y〉0 =
m∑
i=1
(
xiyi
ai
)
+
(−
∑m
i=1 xi) (−
∑m
i=1 yi)
am+1
. (6)
Rewriting am+1 in terms of a1, . . . , am, (6) motivates the following inner product and norm for R
m,
the space of payoffs for G.
Definition 4.7 (Inner Product and Norm). Endow Rm with the following inner product and norm
〈x,y〉 =
m∑
i=1
(
xiyi
ai
)
+
(
∑m
i=1 xi) (
∑m
i=1 yi)
1−
∑m
i=1 ai
,
‖x‖ =
(
m∑
i=1
(
x2i
ai
)
+
(
∑m
i=1 xi)
2
1−
∑m
i=1 ai
) 1
2
.
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Consider the isometry φ : H0 → Rm which simply discards the (m + 1)-th coordinate. It maps
H0A = HA ∩ H
0 and S = O ∩ H0 to HA and O respectively. Equipped with the new inner product
〈·, ·〉, we can discard the extra player, and return to Rm and G. Proposition 4.5 and Theorem 4.6
can now be analogously formulated for the general case, as Proposition 4.8 and Theorem 4.9. The
proofs are in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 4.8 (Payoff as Projection). For any strategy profile s ∈ S, the payoff vector V (s)
equals
V (s) = πHE(s) (P )
where the projection π is taken under the norm ‖·‖.
Theorem 4.9 (Unique Value by Projection). In the game G, the value is given by
V ∗ = V (s∗) = [V1(s
∗), . . . , Vm(s
∗)] = πO (P )
where the projection π is taken under the norm ‖·‖. An optimal equilibrium s∗ = [s∗1, . . . , s
∗
m] is
given by
s∗i = 0 ⇐⇒
[
πO (P )
]
i
= Xi.
The existence of the value was first established in Theorem 3.7. Theorem 4.9 reaffirms that result
by providing an explicit representation using a concise notation. The chosen optimal equilibrium s∗
is determined by identifying the exercise set E(s∗) from the hyperplanes used in projection πO (P ) =
πHE(s∗) (P ).
Remark 4.10. If the original game G is already constant (or zero) sum, then the introduction of
player m + 1 is problematic. Division by zero occurs because am+1 = 1 −
∑
i∈M ai = 0, so G
0, 〈·〉0
and ‖·‖0 from subsection 4.1 are no longer well defined. However, Proposition 4.8 and Theorem 4.9
can still be applied to the constant (or zero) sum case if the following conventions are adopted.
Consider the m+ 1 player game Gǫ, where a1, . . . , am and am+1 are replaced by
aǫi = ai −
ǫ
m
, i ∈ M; aǫm+1 = 1−
∑
i∈M
aǫi = ǫ.
Take G0 to be the limit of Gǫ as ǫ→ 0. Since for any fixed k ∈M and any fixed s ∈ S, the Gǫ payoff
V ǫk (s) is continuous (linear, in fact) in ǫ, the limit V
0
k (s) is indeed the desired G
0 payoff. Furthermore,
V ǫk = maxsk mins−k V
ǫ
k
([
sk, s−k
])
and V
ǫ
k = mins−k maxsk V
ǫ
k
([
sk, s−k
])
are also continuous in ǫ,
so the value of Gǫ converges to the value of G0 as well.
Once again, the payoffs and value of the m player game G are obtained from G0 after discarding
the (m + 1)-th coordinate. Although ‖·‖ does not exist, Proposition 4.8 and Theorem 4.9 can still
be recovered by redefining the projection π. We formally adopt the following convention for the
remainder of the paper.
Definition 4.11 (Projection). When
∑
i∈M ai < 1, then define π as the projection (see Remark
4.3) under ‖·‖ from Definition 4.7. In the case of
∑
i∈M ai = 1, define π for HE , E ⊆ M and O as
follows,
πHE (P ) = lim
ǫ→0
πǫHE (P ), πO (P ) = limǫ→0
πǫO(P )
where πǫ is the projection under the norm
‖x‖ǫ =
(
m∑
i=1
(
x2i
ai −
ǫ
m
)
+
(
∑m
i=1 xi)
2
ǫ
) 1
2
. (7)
Intuitively the (
∑m
i=1 xi)
2
/ǫ term in (7) serves as a penalty function, to keep the deviation
of
∑m
i=1 xi to a minimum during projection. In subsection 4.1, the same effect is produced by
restricting projections to the zero-sum hyperplane H0 (hence using H0A and S instead of HA and
O). The penalty function allows for a cleaner representation consistent with the general case. The
notation of πO (P ) in Theorem 4.9 also conveniently eliminates the need for cases in Theorem 4.6.
12 Unilaterally Competitive Multi-Player Stopping Games
5 Stochastic and Multiple Period Extensions
The goal of this section is to study various extensions of the single period deterministic game. We
begin by presenting a straight forward single period stochastic version. For multiple periods, instead
of only choosing between “exercise” and “not exercise”, each player also have to decide “when to
exercise”. These games are rarely WUC (cf. Definition 2.4), even if the single period building blocks
are. Nevertheless, we attempt to identify generalisations where optimal equilibria and value still
exist.
5.1 Single Period Stochastic Games
The stochastic game is very similar to the deterministic version from Definition 3.3, except the
vectors X and P are not known at the time of exercise. All of the following definitions are taken
under the probability space (Ω,F ,P).
Definition 5.1 (Stochastic Game). A single period stochastic multi-player game G, with players
indexed by M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, is specified by the following:
• The F -measurable random vectors P = [P1, . . . , Pm], X = [X1, . . . , Xm];
• The weights wk(E) =
ak
1−
∑
i∈E ai
for k /∈ E ⊂M, where ai > 0 is deterministic and
∑
i∈M ai ≤
1.
The rules of the game are:
1. The players are only allowed to exercise at time 0, when P and X may not be known exactly.
The payoffs are distributed at time 1.
2. The space of strategy profiles is S =
∏
i∈M Si, where Sk = {0, 1} is the space of pure strategies
for player k with sk = 0 meaning player k exercises at time 0. The exercise set E(s), s ∈ S is
the set of exercising players.
3. For each strategy profile s, the outcome of the game is the expected payoff vector V (s) =
[V1(s), . . . , Vm(s)], defined by
Vk(s) = EP
(
Xk1{k∈E(s)} + X˜k1{k/∈E(s)}
)
where
X˜k = Pk − wk(E(s))
∑
k∈E(s)
(Xk − Pk).
By the linearity of the payoff function Vk(s), the stochastic game is equivalent to a deterministic
game G′ starting at time 0 with P ′ = EP(P ) and X ′ = EP(X). Hence by Theorems 3.7 and 4.9,
the value of G is given by:
Proposition 5.2 (Value by Projection). The stochastic game G has a unique value given by
V (s∗) = πO (EP (P ))
where O is the orthant defined by
O =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≥ EP (Xi) , 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
and the projection π is given by Definition 4.11. A possible optimal equilibrium s∗ = [s∗1, . . . , s
∗
m] is
given by
s∗i = 0 ⇐⇒
[
πO (EP (P ))
]
i
= Xi.
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5.2 Multiple Period Stopping Games
There are various ways of generalising two player game option to multiple players while keeping
the underlying dynamics. This paper will consider a game similar in dynamic to the one studied in
Solan and Vieille [17], which stops as soon as any subset of players chooses to stop. We will use a
payoff function generalising the single period game from Definition 3.3, with the goal of constructing
optimal equilibria in pure strategies. The game will be recursive, in the sense that each player
chooses between an exercise payoff and the value of a shorter game from the next period onward.
It is reminiscent of compound or nested financial options, and it reduces to the discrete time two
player game contingent claim (cf. Kifer [11]) if m = 2 and a1 = a2 = 1/2.
Using standard terminologies for stochastic processes, all of the following definitions are taken
under the probability space (Ω,F ,P) endowed with the filtration F = {Ft : t = 0, 1, . . . , T }, repre-
senting the possible exercise times.
Definition 5.3. For t = 0, 1, . . . , T , a multi-player stochastic stopping game Gt, with players indexed
by M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, is defined on the time interval [t, T ], specified by the following inputs:
• The F-adapted processes Xu = [X1,u, . . . , Xm,u], where u = t, . . . , T ;
• The weights wk(E) =
ak
1−
∑
i∈E ai
for k /∈ E ⊂M, where ai > 0 is deterministic and
∑
i∈M ai ≤
1.
The rules of the game are:
1. Each player can exercise at any time in the interval [t, T ]. The game stops as soon as anyone
exercises. If no one exercises before time T , then everyone must exercise at time T .
2. The strategy sk,t of player k is a stopping time chosen from the space Sk,t of F stopping times,
in the interval [t, T ]. The strategy profile st = [s1,t, . . . , sm,t] ∈ St is the m-tuple of stopping
times. Denote ŝt = s1,t ∧ · · · ∧ sm,t to be the minimal stopping time, also an F stopping time.
The exercise set E(st) = {i ∈M : si,t = ŝt} is the random set of earliest stopping players.
3. For each strategy profile st, the outcome of the game is the expected payoff vector Vt(st) =
[V1,t(st), . . . , Vm,t(st)], defined by
Vk,t(st) = EP
(
Xk,ŝt1{k∈E(st)} + X˜k,ŝt1{k/∈E(st)}
∣∣Ft) (8)
where
X˜k,ŝt = V
∗
k,ŝt+1 − wk(E(st))
∑
i∈E(st)
(
Xi,ŝt − V
∗
i,ŝt+1
)
, ŝt < T. (9)
and V ∗ŝt+1 =
[
V ∗1,ŝt+1, . . . , V
∗
m,ŝt+1
]
is the value of the game Gŝt+1.
As the game is stopped at time ŝt, the indicator functions in (8) separate the exercising players
from the others. Xk,ŝt is the payoff for an exercising player while X˜k,ŝt is the payoff for a non-
exercising player. The game Gŝt+1 can be considered as the continuation of the current game
if it does not stop at time ŝt. Note that in (9), X˜k,ŝt is not defined for ŝt = T , but this does
not matter because if the game is only stopped at T , every player must exercise and receive
Xk,T , not X˜k,T .
Definition 5.3 is recursive. Since ŝt + 1 > t, the payoff of Gt may depend on the values of
Gt+1, . . . ,GT (which are themselves subgames of Gt). Intuitively, it is perhaps easier to view the
stopping game as a sequence of single period games. If Gt is stopped at t, then the exercising players
receive Xk,t while the other players receive
EP
(
V ∗k,t+1
∣∣Ft)− wk(E)∑
i∈E
(
Xi,t − EP
(
V ∗i,t+1
∣∣Ft)).
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If Gt is not stopped at time t, then it continues on to become the game Gt+1. And finally the game
GT always stops at time T as everyone exercises.
Proposition 5.4. The expected payoff of Gt, Vt(st) = [V1,t(st), . . . , Vm,t(st)], can be represented
using the projection as follows:
Vt(st) = EP
(
πHE(st)
(
V ∗ŝt+1
)
1{ŝt<T} +XT1{ŝt=T}
∣∣Ft),
where HE(st) is the Fŝt-measurable hyperplane
HE(st) =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi = Xi,ŝt , ∀i ∈ E(st)
}
.
Proof. This follows immediately from Definition 5.3 and Proposition 4.8.
Theorem 5.5. Recursively define the Ft-measurable vector Ut = [U1,t, . . . , Um,t] by
Ut = πOt
(
EP
(
Ut+1
∣∣Ft)) , for 0 ≤ t < T, UT = XT (10)
with Ot being the Ft-measurable orthant
Ot =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≥ Xi,t, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
, (11)
and the projection π is given by Definition 4.11. Define the set of F-stopping times τ to be
τ =
[
τ1, . . . , τm
]
, where τi = inf
{
u ∈ [t, T ] : Ui,u = Xi,u
}
. (12)
Then
1. Ut = Vt(τ) taking τ as a strategy profile of Gt, and
2. τ is an optimal equilibrium of the multi-player stochastic stopping game Gt, hence Ut = V ∗t is
the value of Gt.
Proof. The statements are proven simultaneously by backward induction. In the case of t = T ,
τ = [T, . . . , T ]. The game GT is always stopped at time T with the payoff vector XT = UT = VT (τ)
also being the value. Now assume the statements are true for the game Gt+1, so its value is given by
V ∗t+1 = Ut+1 = Vt+1(τ). (13)
Note throughout the proof that if the game Gt is stopped at time t, then it is reduced to a single
period stochastic game (cf. Definition 5.1) with payoff vectors Xt and V
∗
t+1. Denote this single
period game by G′. Also write τ̂ = τ1 ∧ · · · ∧ τm.
(Statement 1) Case 1: If τ̂ = t, the game is stopped at time t. By Proposition 5.2 and (12), τ is an
optimal equilibrium of the single period game G′, whose value is
Ut = πOt
(
EP
(
Ut+1
∣∣Ft)) = πOt (EP(V ∗t+1 ∣∣Ft)) = πHE(τ) (EP(V ∗t+1 ∣∣Ft)) .
The result then follows from Proposition 5.4, noting that HE(τ) is Ft-measurable,
Ut = πHE(τ)
(
EP
(
V ∗t+1
∣∣Ft)) = EP(πHE(τ) (V ∗τ̂+1) ∣∣Ft) = Vt(τ).
Case 2: If τ̂ ≥ t+ 1, the game is not stopped at time t, then by (10), (11) and (12), Ui,t > Xi,t
and Ut lies in the interior of Ot. Applying the induction hypothesis (13),
Ut = πOt
(
EP
(
Ut+1
∣∣Ft)) = EP(Ut+1 ∣∣Ft) = EP(Vt+1(τ) ∣∣Ft).
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It is sufficient to show Vt(τ) = EP
(
Vt+1(τ)
∣∣Ft), which is true by noting τ̂ ≥ t + 1 and applying
Proposition 5.4,
Vt(τ) = EP
(
EP
(
πHE(τ)
(
V ∗τ̂+1
) ∣∣Ft+1) ∣∣Ft) = EP(Vt+1(τ) ∣∣Ft) if τ̂ < T,
Vt(τ) = EP
(
EP
(
XT
∣∣Ft+1) ∣∣Ft) = EP(Vt+1(τ) ∣∣Ft) if τ̂ = T.
(Statement 2) By Statement 1, (10) and the induction hypothesis (13),
Vt(τ) = Ut = πOt
(
EP
(
Ut+1
∣∣Ft)) = πOt (EP(V ∗t+1 ∣∣Ft)) .
To check τ is an optimal equilibrium (cf. Definition 2.1), we require for each k ∈M,
Vk,t
([
τk, s−k
])
≥
[
πOt
(
EP
(
V ∗t+1
∣∣Ft)) ]k ≥ Vk,t ([sk, τ−k])
for all sk ∈ Sk, s−k ∈ S−k. Let s′ =
[
τk, s−k
]
, s′′ =
[
sk, τ−k
]
be alternative strategy profiles with
minimal stopping times ŝ′, ŝ′′.
Case 1: If ŝ′ = ŝ′′ = t, then both s′ and s′′ can be interpreted as strategy profiles of the single
period game G′. Hence the result follows from Proposition 5.2 because
[
πOt
(
EP
(
V ∗t+1
∣∣Ft)) ]k is
value of G′ for player k.
Case 2: If ŝ′ ≥ t+1, then s′ is a valid strategy profile of Gt+1. Also we must have τk ≥ t+1 being
a maximin strategy, because it belongs to an optimal equilibrium of Gt+1 by (12) and the induction
hypothesis. From Proposition 5.4,
Vt(s
′) = EP
(
EP
(
πHE(s′)
(
V ∗ŝ′+1
) ∣∣Ft+1) ∣∣Ft) = EP(Vt+1(s′) ∣∣Ft) if ŝ′ < T,
Vt(s
′) = EP
(
EP
(
XT
∣∣Ft+1) ∣∣Ft) = EP(Vt+1(s′) ∣∣Ft) if ŝ′ = T.
Using the fact that τk is a maximin strategy,
Vk,t(s
′) = EP
(
Vk,t+1(s
′)
∣∣Ft) = EP(Vk,t ([τk, s−k]) ∣∣Ft) ≥ EP(V ∗k,t+1 ∣∣Ft). (14)
Since τk ≥ t+ 1, by (12) we must have[
πOt
(
EP
(
V ∗t+1
∣∣Ft)) ]k = [πOt (EP(Ut+1 ∣∣Ft)) ]k > Xk,t. (15)
By Proposition 5.2 and (15), player k does not exercise in the optimal equilibrium of the single
period game G′. Interpreting EP
(
V ∗k,t+1
∣∣Ft) as the expected payoff of player k if no one exercises,
and using the definition of optimal equilibrium,
EP
(
V ∗k,t+1
∣∣Ft) ≥ [πOt (EP(V ∗t+1 ∣∣Ft)) ]k. (16)
(14) and (16) imply Vk,t(s
′) ≥
[
πOt
(
EP
(
V ∗t+1
∣∣Ft)) ]k as required.
Case 3: If ŝ′′ ≥ t+ 1, by arguments similar to the ones used for (14)
Vk,t(s
′′) = EP
(
Vk,t+1(s
′′)
∣∣Ft) ≤ EP(V ∗k,t+1 ∣∣Ft). (17)
For all i 6= k, since τi ≥ t + 1, by (12) we have
[
πOt
(
EP
(
V ∗t+1
∣∣Ft)) ]i = [πOt (EP(Ut+1 ∣∣Ft)) ]i >
Xi,t. By Proposition 5.2, if i 6= k, player i does not exercise in the optimal equilibrium of the single
period game G′. Again interpreting EP
(
V ∗k,t+1
∣∣Ft) as the expected payoff of player k if no one
exercises, and using the definition of optimal equilibrium,
EP
(
V ∗k,t+1
∣∣Ft) ≤ [πOt (EP(V ∗t+1 ∣∣Ft)) ]k. (18)
(17) and (18) imply Vk,t(s
′′) ≤
[
πOt
(
EP
(
V ∗t+1
∣∣Ft)) ]k as required.
Both statements are hence proven and the induction is complete.
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It is possible to further generalise the game by making the weights (hence ai) time dependent
and F-adapted. The weights at time ŝ will be applied as the game is stopped. Theorem 5.5 will
analogously hold, with the projection π also made time dependent. But for brevity that case will
not be included here.
Remark 5.6. The stopping game described by Definition 5.3 is perhaps not the most obvious
generalisation of the single period game. A more natural generalisation would be for the non-
exercising player k to receive
Xk,T − wk(E(st))
∑
i∈E(st)
(
Xi,ŝt −Xk,T
)
, ŝt < T,
as the game is stopped. That is, using Xk,T instead of the value V
∗
k,ŝt+1
of Gt+1. But even in
deterministic cases, this does not always produce optimal equilibria in pure strategies. For example,
consider a game with X0 = [−1,−1, 0],X1 = [−2,−2, 4],X2 = [0, 0, 0] and a1 = a2 = a3 = 1/3.
Player 3 will always want to exercise at time 1, while there is a prisoner’s dilemma between players 1
and 2 at time 0. This game has two Nash equilibria (with different payoffs) but no optimal equilibria
in pure strategies.
5.3 Quitting Games
A quitting game is an alternative formulation of the multiple period case. As opposed to a stopping
game, a quitting game does not end when one player stops or exercises. Instead, the non-exercising
players continue the game and may exercise at a later date. We focus on the deterministic case here,
as the stochastic case does not always produce optimal equilibria (see Remark 5.10).
Definition 5.7. A deterministic multi-player stochastic quitting game G, with players indexed by
M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, is specified by the following inputs:
• The vectors Xt = [X1,t, . . . , Xm,t], t = 0, . . . , T ;
• The weights wk(E) =
ak
1−
∑
i∈E ai
, where ai > 0 and
∑
i∈M ai ≤ 1.
The rules of the game are as follows. If player k exercises at time t in the interval [0, T − 1] (or
sk = t), he receives a payoff of Xk,t. If player k does not exercise before time T (or sk = T ), he
receives Xk,T −wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)(Xi,t −Xi,T ) at time T , where E(s) is the set of players exercising
before time T and s = [s1, . . . , sm]. In other words, the payoff vector V (s) = [V1(s), . . . , Vm(s)] is
given by
Vk(s) =
{
Xk,sk , sk < T,
Xk,T − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)(Xi,si −Xi,T ), sk = T.
Theorem 5.8. The quitting game G has a unique value given by
V ∗ = πO (Xt)
where O is the orthant defined by
O =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≥ max
0≤t≤T−1
Xi,t, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
and the projection π is given by Definition 4.11. A possible optimal equilibrium s∗ = [s∗1, . . . , s
∗
m] is
given by
s∗i = min
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : πO (Xt)i ≤ Xi,t
}
.
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Proof. Consider a single period game G′ with X ′k = max0≤t≤T−1Xk,t and P
′
k = Xk,T . By Theorem
4.9, V ∗ is the value of G′. If player k exercises then πO (Xt) = X ′k = max0≤t≤T−1Xk,t. If player
k does not exercise then V ∗k = Xk,T − wk(E(s
∗))D(s∗) ≤ Xk,T (recall D(s∗) ≥ 0 from Lemma 3.9).
Either way s∗k is well-defined, and the exercise decision corresponds to the optimal equilibrium of
G′. Hence it is easy to check that V ∗ = V (s∗).
Now to see s∗ is an optimal equilibrium of the quitting game G, as per Definition 2.1, first we
check that it is a Nash equilibrium, or
Vi
([
s∗k, s
∗
−k
])
≥ Vk
([
sk, s
∗
−k
])
, ∀ sk ∈ S−k.
If s∗k < T and player k exercises. He cannot improve his payoff by exercising at another time
since Xk,s∗
k
is maximal, neither can he improve by not exercising since s∗ corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium in G′.
If instead s∗k = T and player k does not exercise, it is sufficient to check that he cannot improve
by exercising at any time, or V ∗ ≥ max0≤t≤T−1Xk,t = X ′k. This is certainly true since, once again,
s∗ corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in G′. Therefore s∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G.
To complete the proof, we are left to check
Vk
([
s∗k, s−k
])
≥ Vk
([
s∗k, s
∗
−k
])
, ∀ s−k ∈ S−k.
If s∗k < T and player k exercises, his payoff is fixed and cannot be decreased by the action of other
players. If instead s∗k = T and player k does not exercise, write s =
[
s∗k, s−k
]
, then
Vk(s) = Xk,T − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)
(Xi,si −Xi,T )
≥ Xk,T − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)
(
max
0≤t≤T−1
Xi,t −Xi,T
)
= P ′k − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)
(X ′i − P
′
i ) = Vk(s
′) (19)
where s′ is the strategy profile in which any exercising player under s chooses to exercise for maximal
payoff X ′i instead. But s
′ corresponds to a strategy profile in G′ with player k not exercising. Since
s∗ is an optimal equilibrium of G′, we have Vk(s
′) ≥ Vk(s
∗). Combining with (19), it implies
Vk(s) ≥ Vk(s∗), as required.
One thing to note about Theorem 5.8 is that it doesn’t specify the amount of information available
to the players regarding the exercise decisions of others. Unlike a stopping game, the strategies in
a quitting game can also depend on the observable actions of other players. However, if we denote
the total information available to player k over time by the filtration Fk = {Fk,t, t = 0, . . . , T }, then
the strategy sk is an Fk stopping time. Theorem 5.8 shows that, in the quitting game, regardless of
how much or little any player observes about the actions of others, the value of the game is fixed.
An optimal equilibrium attaining the value can be chosen independently.
Remark 5.9. If G is a perfect information quitting game, that is, si is an Fj stopping time for any
i 6= j, then a subgame perfect optimal equilibrium can be constructed. Denote the set of exercising
player up to time t−1 by Et−1(s) and the set of remaining players byMt =M\Et−1(s). By Lemma
3.8, the quitting game Gt on the interval [t, T ] is a subgame amongst the remaining playersMt, but
with following variable modifications:
• X ′k,u = Xk,u, for t ≤ u ≤ T − 1, k ∈Mt;
• X ′k,T = Xk,T − wk(Et−1(s))
∑
i∈Et−1(s)
(Xi,si −Xi,T ), for k ∈Mt;
• Weights defined by a′k = wk(Et−1(s)) =
ak
1−
∑
i∈Et−1(s)
ai
, for k ∈Mt; and
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• Strategy profile st = [sk,t, k ∈Mt] ∈ St.
A subgame perfect optimal equilibrium s∗∗ is an optimal equilibrium for any reachable subgame
of G. In particular it is also an optimal equilibrium and attains the value V (s∗∗) = V ∗. The optimal
equilibrium s∗ constructed in Theorem 5.8 is not necessarily subgame perfect, as the strategy s∗k
of player k does not take the actions of others into account. For example, assume another player
i deviates from s∗i by exercising too early. The strategy s
∗
k does not adjust to punish the mistake.
Even though the value of V ∗k is still guaranteed, player k misses the chance to guarantee an even
higher payoff, created by the sub-optimal deviation of player i.
The subgame perfect optimal equilibrium can be constructed recursively, by backward induction
with respect to both time and remaining set of players. Specifically, for the quitting game subgame
Gt, the subgame perfect optimal equilibrium s∗∗t =
[
s∗∗k,t, k ∈Mt
]
is given by s∗∗k,T = T and
s∗∗k,t = t1{πOt (Xk,T )k=Xk,t} + s
∗∗
k,t+11{πOt(Xk,T )k>Xk,t}
, t < T
where Ot =
{
xi ≥ maxt≤u≤T−1Xi,u, i ∈ Mt
}
is an R|Mt| orthant, the projection π is defined by
Definition 4.11 with modifications for Mt, and s
∗
k,t+1 is the player k subgame perfect optimal equi-
librium strategy of the subgame Gt+1. Finally s∗∗ = s∗∗0 is the subgame perfect optimal equilibrium
of the perfect information quitting game G.
On the other hand, in an imperfect information quitting game, where the players’ actions are
partially or completely hidden to others, it is not always possible to determine the current subgame
Gt. Therefore subgame perfect optimal equilibria may not exist. But by using the same idea
as above, each player can construct a strategy which is the optimal equilibrium strategy in all
observable subgames. And as mentioned, the lack of subgame perfection does not change the value
of the quitting game.
Remark 5.10. In the stochastic case, unfortunately equilibria may not exist in pure strategies. For
example, a game with a1 = a2 = a3 = 1/3, F1 = F2 = {∅, {ω1}, {ω2},Ω}, P(ω1) = P(ω2) = 1/2, and
the payoffs given by X0 = [2.1, 3.5,−50], X1(ω1) = [−50,−50,−5.05], X1(ω2) = [4,−50,−50] and
X2(ω1) = X2(ω2) = [0, 5,−5].
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Propositions 3.4 and 3.5
Before proving the Proposition 3.4, we require the following lemmas.
Lemma A.1. Given a subset E ⊂M with 0 ≤ |E(s)| ≤ m− 2 and i, j /∈ E(s), let E ′ = E ∪ {j}. If s
and s′ are strategy profiles with E(s) = E and E(s′) = E ′ (hence player j exercises in s′ but not s),
Then
(Vi(s)− Vi(s
′)) + wi(E
′)(Vj(s)− Vj(s
′)) = {wi(E
′)[1 − wj(E)]− wi(E)}D(s). (20)
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of V , noting that D(s′) = D(s) + (Xj − Pj). Start
with
Vi(s)− Vi(s
′) = wi(E
′)D(s′)− wi(E)D(s)
= (wi(E
′)− wi(E))D(s) + wi(E
′)(Xj − Pj),
wi(E
′)(Vj(s)− Vj(s
′)) = wi(E
′)(Pj − wj(E)D(s) −Xj)
= −wi(E
′)wj(E)D(s) − wi(E
′)(Xj − Pj).
Adding the expressions yields the desired result.
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Lemma A.2. The game G is WUC for all choices X and P , if and only if both of the following
Conditions hold:
1. For any E ⊂ M, 1 ≤ |E| ≤ m− 2 and i, j /∈ E,
wi(E ∪ {j})(1− wj(E)) = wi(E);
2. For any E ′ ⊂M, 1 ≤ |E ′| ≤ m− 1 and i /∈ E ′,
wi(E
′) > 0.
Proof. We prove the statement in three parts.
(WUC ⇒ Condition 1) Take s and s′ to be strategy profiles with E(s) = E and E(s′) = E ′ = E ∪{j}.
If the game G is WUC for all X and P , then
Vj(s) = Vj(s
′) =⇒ Vi(s) = Vi(s
′).
By Lemma A.1, (20) becomes
{wi(E
′)[1− wj(E)]− wi(E)}D(s) = 0.
When |E| ≥ 1, we can choose X,P so that D(s) 6= 0. Hence
wi(E
′)[1 − wj(E)] = wi(E)
and Condition 1 is proven.
(Condition 1 +WUC⇒ Condition 1 + Condition 2) Now assume Condition 1 holds, hence wi(E ′)[1−
wj(E)] − wi(E) = 0 for |E| ≥ 1. Note that if |E| = 0, then D(s) = 0. In either case, (20) always
simplifies to
(Vi(s)− Vi(s
′)) = wi(E
′)(Vj(s
′)− Vj(s)).
But the G being WUC requires Vj(s′) − Vj(s) > 0 =⇒ Vi(s) − Vi(s′) ≥ 0. Since the weights are
required to be non-zero, we have wi(E ′) > 0 for all 1 ≤ |E ′| ≤ m− 1 and Condition 2 is proven.
(WUC ⇐ Condition 1 + Condition 2) As before, Condition 1 quickly gives
(Vi(s)− Vi(s
′)) = wi(E
′)(Vj(s
′)− Vj(s)).
When Condition 2 also holds, it’s easily checked that the game is indeed WUC.
Proposition 3.4. It is sufficient to completely solve the system presented in Conditions 1 and 2 of
Lemma A.2. Consider the case where m ≥ 4. By Condition 2, we have 0 < wi({j}) < 1 for all i 6= j.
By Condition 1,
wi({j})
1− wk({j})
= wi({j, k}) =
wi({k})
1− wj({k})
⇐⇒
wi({j})
wi({k})
=
1− wk({j})
1− wj({k})
.
Since the only the left hand side depend on i, we have, for i, j, k, l distinct,
wi({j})
wi({k})
=
wl({j})
wl({k})
.
This system of equations has the parametric solution wi({j}) = aibj , with ai, bi 6= 0. Substituting
back,
aibj
1− akbj
=
aibk
1− ajbk
⇐⇒ aj +
1
bj
= ak +
1
bk
⇐⇒ ai +
1
bj
= c
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where c is a constant for all i. Solving for bj yields wi({j}) = aibj =
ai
c−aj
. Scale all ai by a factor
of 1/c,
wi({j}) =
ai
1− aj
.
Substituting into Condition 1 while recursively incrementing the size of E , we obtain
wk(E) =
ak
1−
∑
i∈E ai
.
Condition 2 adds the restrictions ak > 0,
∑
i6=k ai < 1. This solution can easily be checked to always
satisfy both Conditions 1 and 2.
The cases for m = 2, 3 can be easily solved to obtain the same solutions.
Proposition 3.5. First note that for i 6= j
wi(M\ {i}) =
ai
1−
∑
j 6=i aj
> 1.
On the other hand, as before, wi(E) < 1 if |E| ≤ m− 2.
We will simply check all the possibilities. If {3, . . . ,m} ⊆ E or if there are only two players, then
the cases are the following.
• If both players 1 and 2 exercise, then V1 = V2 = 0, but player 2 can receive−1+w2(M\{2}) > 0
if he doesn’t exercise.
• If only player 1 exercises, then V1 = 0, but player 1 can receive P1 = 1 if he doesn’t exercise.
• If only player 2 exercises, then V1 = 1− w1(M\ {1}) < 0, but player 1 can receive X1 = 0 if
he also exercises.
• If neither player 1 or 2 exercises, then V2 = −1, but player 2 can receive X2 = 0 if he also
exercises.
If some player k 6= 1, 2 doesn’t exercise, so k /∈ E , then the cases are the following.
• If both players 1 and 2 exercise, then V1 = V2 = 0, but |E \ {1}| ≤ m − 2 and player 1 can
receive 1− w1(E \ {1}) > 0 if he doesn’t exercise.
• If only player 1 exercises, then |E| ≤ m− 2 and V2 = −1+w1(E) < 0, but player 2 can receive
X2 = 0 if he exercises.
• If only player 2 exercises, then Vk = 0−wk(E) < 0, but player k can receive Xk = 0 if he also
exercises.
• If neither player 1 or 2 exercises, then V2 = −1, but player 2 can receive X2 = 0 if he also
exercises.
In all cases, the pure strategy profile is not an equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Lemmas 3.8 and 3.9
Proof of Lemma 3.8. Let s′ ∈ SM′ be any strategy profile of the subgame GM′ and E ′ = E ′(s′) be
the corresponding set of exercising players. Let s ∈ S be a matching strategy profile of the original
game G, so
s = [sk = s
′
k, k ∈M
′; sk = 0, k /∈ M
′]
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and E(s) = E ∪ E ′. It is sufficient to check that for any k ∈ M′, the payoff V ′k(s
′) of the subgame
matches the payoff Vk(s) of the original game.
First note that the weights of GM′ can be written as
w′k(E
′) =
a′k
1−
∑
i∈E′ a
′
i
=
wk(E)
1−
∑
i∈E′ wi(E)
(21)
=
ak
1−
∑
i∈E ai
1−
∑
i∈E′
ai
1−
∑
j∈E aj
=
ak
1−
∑
i∈E∪E′ ai
= wk(E(s)). (22)
If k ∈ E ′, then V ′k(s
′) = X ′k = Xk = Vk(s). Otherwise,
V ′k(s
′) = P ′k − w
′
k(E
′)
∑
i∈E′
(X ′i − P
′
i )
= Pk − wk(E)
∑
i∈E
(Xi − Pi)− w
′
k(E
′)
∑
i∈E′
Xi − Pi + wi(E)∑
j∈E
(Xj − Pj)

= Pk −
(
wk(E) + w
′
k(E
′)
∑
i∈E′
wi(E)
)∑
i∈E
(Xi − Pi)− w
′
k(E
′)
∑
i∈E′
(Xi − Pi). (23)
Rearranging (21) as wk(E) + w′k(E
′)
∑
i∈E′ wi(E) = w
′
k(E
′), we can rewrite (23) as
V ′k(s
′) = Pk − w
′
k(E
′)
∑
i∈E
(Xi − Pi)− w
′
k(E
′)
∑
i∈E′
(Xi − Pi)
= Pk − w
′
k(E
′)
∑
i∈E(s)
(Xi − Pi)
= Pk − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)
(Xi − Pi) by (22)
= Vk(s),
as required.
Lemma 3.9. Assume the contrary, so D(s∗) < 0. Then there must exists a player k ∈ E(s∗)
with Xk − Pk < 0. Now if player k chooses not to exercise, his payoff will be Vk(s′) = Pk −
wk(E(s′))
∑
i∈E(s′)(Xi − Pi), where s
′ is the modified strategy profile. Note that s′ = [1, s∗−k] and
s∗ = [0, s∗−k] and thus E(s
′) = E(s∗)\{k}. Since s∗ is an equilibrium, we have Vk(s′) ≤ Vk(s∗) = Xk.
Therefore,
Xk − Vk(s
′) = Xk − Pk + wk(E(s
′))
∑
i∈E(s′)
(Xi − Pi) ≥ 0. (24)
Since Xk − Pk < 0, (24) implies
∑
i∈E(s′)(Xi − Pi) ≥ 0. Recall in Definition 3.6, 0 < wk(E(s
′)) ≤ 1.
Therefore
D(s∗) =
∑
i∈E(s∗)
(Xi − Pi) ≥ Xk − Pk + wk(E(s
′))
∑
i∈E(s′)
(Xi − Pi) ≥ 0,
contradicting the assumption of D(s∗) < 0.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.9
The following lemma is a standard result of projection in linear algebra. It is used throughout the
other proofs.
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Lemma A.3. In Rm, if K is a hyperplane, the projection π is orthogonal, that is, πK (P ) is the
unique vector in K such that
〈πK (P )− P ,Q− πK (P )〉 = 0, ∀Q ∈ K.
Furthermore, if J is a convex subset of the hyperplane K, then
πJ (P ) = πJ (πK (P )) .
Proof of Proposition 4.8. The vector V (s)
V (s) =
[
Vi(s) = Xi, i ∈ E(s), Vi(s) = Pi − wi(E(s))D(s), i /∈ E(s)
]
.
certainly lies in the hyperplane
HE(s) =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi = Xi for every i ∈ E(s)
}
.
So it is sufficient to check that
v := P − V (s) =
[
vi = Pi −Xi, i ∈ E(s), vi = wi(E(s))D(s), i /∈ E(s)
]
is orthogonal to HE(s). Let u :=
[
ui = 0, i ∈ E(s)
]
be any vector lying entirely in HE(s). Then 〈u,v〉
evaluates to
∑
i/∈E(s)
uiwi(E(s))D(s)
ai
+
(∑
i/∈E(s) ui
)(∑
i∈E(s) (Pi −Xi) +
∑
i/∈E(s) wi(E(s))D(s)
)
1−
∑m
i=1 ai
=
∑
i/∈E(s) uiD(s)
1−
∑
i∈E(s) ai
+
(∑
i/∈E(s) ui
)(
−D(s) +
∑
i/∈E(s) ai
1−
∑
i∈E(s) ai
D(s)
)
1−
∑m
i=1 ai
=
∑
i/∈E(s) uiD(s)
1−
∑
i∈E(s) ai
1 + −
(
1−
∑
i∈E(s) ai
)
+
∑
i/∈E(s) ai
1−
∑m
i=1 ai

=
∑
i/∈E(s) uiD(s)
1−
∑
i∈E(s) ai
(1− 1) = 0
as required.
Before proving Theorem 4.9, a couple more lemmas are needed.
Lemma A.4. Assume that P ∈ O. Then πHA (P ) ∈ O for any subset A ⊆M.
Proof. By Theorem 4.8, the projection πHA (P ) corresponds to the payoff vector when A is the set
of exercising players. Let s be the corresponding strategy profile. In particular, for any i ∈ A
[πHA (P )]i = Xi ≤ Pi.
and thus D(s) =
∑
i∈A(Xi − Pi) ≤ 0. Consequently, for any j ∈M \A
[πHA (P )]j = Pj − wj(E(s))(s)D(s) ≥ Pj ≥ Xj ,
and thus πHA (P ) ∈ O.
Lemma A.5. Let k ∈ M. If πO (P ) /∈ H{k} then Pk > Xk. Equivalently, if Pk ≤ Xk then
πO (P ) ∈ H{k}.
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P
πO (P )
Q
H{k}
Figure 1: Pk = Xk
Proof. Suppose that Pk ≤ Xk and assume that πO (P ) /∈ H{k}. Then the projectionQ = πH{k} (πO (P ))
is still in O (by Lemma A.4) and it is distinct from πO (P ) (since πO (P ) /∈ H{k}). We will show
that
‖P −Q‖ < ‖P − πO (P )‖ , (25)
which contradicts the definition of πO (P ).
In the case of Pk = Xk, as shown in Figure 1, we have P ,Q ∈ H{k} and πO (P ) − Q being
orthogonal to P −Q. Hence
‖P −Q‖2 < ‖P −Q‖2 + ‖πO (P )−Q‖
2
= ‖P − πO (P )‖
2
.
P
πO (P )
Q
R
H{k}
Ĥ{k}
Figure 2: Pk < Xk
To establish (25) in the case Pk < Xk, as shown in Figure 2, we introduce a hyperplane Ĥ{k}
parallel to H{k} by setting
Ĥ{k} =
{
x ∈ Rm : xk = Pk
}
,
so that, in particular, P ∈ Ĥ{k}. Let R = πĤ{k} (πO (P )), so that also
R = π
Ĥ{k}
(
πH{k}(πO(P ))
)
= π
Ĥ{k}
(Q) .
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Since Pk < Xk, R ∈ Ĥ{k} and πO(P ) ∈ O \H{k} lie on opposite sides of the hyperplane H{k}. It is
thus clear that
‖R−Q‖ < ‖R−Q‖+ ‖Q− πO (P )‖ = ‖R− πO (P )‖ . (26)
Finally, since P −R is orthogonal to both R−Q and R− πO (P ), we have
‖P −Q‖2 = ‖P −R‖2 + ‖R−Q‖2
and
‖P − πO (P )‖
2 = ‖P −R‖2 + ‖R − πO (P )‖
2 .
Therefore, (26) implies (25), as required.
Theorem 4.9. Begin by noting that in the subgame GM′ (where M′ = M \ E) defined in Lemma
3.8, the variables P ′k can be rewritten as
P ′k = Pk − wk(E)
∑
i∈E
(Xi − Pi) =
[
πHE (P )
]
k
according to Proposition 4.8. The mapping φ : HE → Rm−|E|, defined by discarding the coordinates
with indices in E , is an isometry to the space of GM′ payoffs. Endowed it with the norm
‖x‖′ =
(∑
i∈M′
(
x2i
a′i
)
+
(∑
i∈M′ xi
)2
1−
∑
i∈M′ a
′
i
) 1
2
.
and let π′ be the corresponding projection function.
Back to the main proof, it is sufficient to show that the strategy profile s∗ defined by
s∗i = 0 ⇐⇒
[
πO (P )
]
i
= Xi
is a Nash equilibrium (hence an optimal equilibrium since G is WUC). This is done using the same
induction from the proof of Theorem 3.7, but with a few additions. The base case of m = 1 can be
easily checked.
Consider m ≥ 2. If Pi > Xi for all i, then P lies in the interior of O. So πO (P ) = P and
s∗ = 1 is an equilibrium. If Pk ≤ Xk for some k, consider the m− 1 player subgame G{−k}. By the
induction hypothesis, s′ ∈ S−k defined by
s′i = 0 ⇐⇒
[
π′O′P
′
]
i
= Xi, ∀ i ∈ M \ {k}
is an equilibrium of G{−k}. Apply the isometry φ
−1, then Lemma A.3,[
π′O′ (P
′)
]
i
=
[
πO∩H{k}
(
πH{k} (P )
) ]
i
=
[
πO∩H{k} (P )
]
i
, ∀ i ∈M \ {k}.
By Lemma A.5, Pk ≤ Xk implies πO (P ) ∈ H{k}. Hence πO∩H{k} (P ) = πO (P ) and s
′ can be
rewritten as
s′i = 0 ⇐⇒
[
πO (P )
]
i
= Xi, ∀ i ∈ M \ {k}.
Finally
[
πO (P )
]
k
= Xk implies s
∗
k = 0, therefore
s∗ =
[
s∗k = 0, s
∗
−k = s
′].
By the proof of Theorem 3.7, s∗ must be an equilibrium of G, as required.
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